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TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTICS AND THE 
PARADIGMS OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY* 
by 
KARL-OTTO AIPEL 
I. Exposition** 
In order to expose the main purpose of my lecture, I must point out that I do 
not intend to give a historical account of First Philosophy. I intend rather to 
display the systematical conception of transcendental semiotics as First Philosophy. 
I shall try to realize that aim through an ideal-typical reconstruction and critique of 
some historically given positions of philosophy. In taking the licence of a rather 
simplified reconstruction of those historical positions of philosophy, I would like to 
account for the transcendental-semiotical presuppositions of modern (language-) 
analytical p1hilosophy by claiming that transcendental semiotics may in fact be 
conceived as a new paradigm of First Philosophy. That is, as the completion of 
language-analytical-philosophy as the third historical paradigm of First Philosophy. 
As such, it may in fact sUJpersede, or rather "suspend" and preserve in a Hegelian 
sense, the two prec.-eding paradigms of First Philosophy, viz. ontology or 
metaphysics. in the Aristotelian sense and critique of knowledge or philosophy of 
conciousness in the sense of Kant (or even in the sense of modern philosophy from 
Descartes .through Husserl). In order to show this, I shall try to derive a series of 
possible abstractive or reductive fallacies from the well understood conception of 
the sign-function or semiosis and thereby ideal-typically reconstruct and account 
for some of the main shortcomings that are involved in the three paradigms of First 
Philosophy, and in some of their subparadigms. 
II. The Triadic Sign-Relation and its Implication in the 
Light of Transcendental Semiotics. 
I start out by taking up the Peircean thesis that the sign-function or semiosis is 
an illustration of an irreducible triadic or three place relation, as it is expressed, e.g., 
in the following definition of Peirce's: 
"A sign, or representation, is something which stands .to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity."1 
The three elements or relatives of the triadic relation in this definition are the 
sign itself, its object which is denotated in some respect, and the addre;see or 
interpreter of the sign. It is this explication of the triadic sign-relation that was 
taken as point of departure by C.W. Morris in his "Foundation of the Theory of 
Signs112 where it was made the basis of a three-dimensional semiotics through 
supplementing the semantic relation between the sign and its object and the 
pragmatic relation between the sign and its interpreter by the syntactic relation 
between signs within the frame of a sign-system or language. (See figure I.) 
3 
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My motive for taking this Peirce/Morris-schema of semiosis or semiotics, 
respectively, as starting and vantage point for exposing the idea of a transcendental 
semiotics is provided by two interconnected facts of transcendental reflection upon 
the conditions of the possibility of intersubjectively valid thought. 
On the one hand, the triadic sign-relation makes up a minimal basis element of 
any intersubjectively valid knowledge, since its object-meaning has to be mediated 
through the intersubjectively valid meaning of language-signs. On the other hand, 
any argument concerning the validity of knowledge or any other human 
validity-claim is itself a triadic sign of some sort, not withstanding the fact that in 
dealing with arguments in terms of formal logic one usually abstracts from the 
pragmatic dimension of these signs, as e.g., from the fact that propositions as parts 
of arguments have to be communicated by somebody through speech-acts. Nt>w 
arguments at the :same time make up that condition of the possibility of 
intersubjectively valid philosophical thought behind which self-reflective thought 
cannot go back, since even solitary thought, being the "voiceless dialog of the soul 
with itself" according to Plato, must participate in the structure of public 
argumentation. Hence it seems suggestive, or even necessary, to take the semiotic 
structure o f  cognition and arguments as starting and vanLage point for transcen· 
dental semiotics as actual possibility of fundamental grounding in philosophy. 
Now from this program it follows that from the outset I have to assign an 
interpretation to the Peirce/Morris-schema of semiosis that, being transcendental­
semiotic, deviates in some respects at least from Morris' interpretation. My 
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transcendental re-interpretation will refer to all three dimensions of the triadic 
sign-relation which, on Morris' account, are to be considered as many topics of 
either empirical-behavioristic or formal-constructive disciplines; viz. syntactics 
dealing with the relation between signs that makes up the grammatical structure of 
a language as a sign-system, semantics dealing with the relation between the.sign 
and its real denotatum, and pragmatics, dealing with the relation between the sign 
and its user or interpreter, be it a speaker or a hearer. 
First I have to make clear that talking about the semantical dimension of the 
sign-function as that of standing for, or denotating, real objects can only be 
justified by the fact that in what follows we are only dealing with the so called 
representative or, in Morris' terminology, designative "mode of signifying", or, in 
other words, with the function of speech as the mediator of cognition, as it is also 
regarded in the case of Carnap's use of the term semantic within the frame of his 
(semiotically founded) logic of science. So we can, in the present context, abstract 
from many other ''modes of signifying", as e.g., "appraisive", "prescriptive" and 
"formative" ones, which also have a semantical dimension, according to Morris' 
later elaboration of his se'lniotics,3 not to speak of th� later Wittgenstein's 
questioning the traditional absolutization of the designative or naming function of 
words in his conception of the diversity of language.games. 
Second, I have to point out that, even under the abstractive presupposition of 
the repre,sentative function of signs in the service of cognition, we are not entitled 
to identify the semantical dimension with the sign's denotation of real objects as 
long as we abstract from the pragmatical dimension of sign-use, as it is done e.g., in 
empiric-linguistic semantics of language-systems, especially in F.de Saussure's 
"linguistique de la langue'', and in formal constructive semantics, especially in 
Tarski's semantical explication of truth. For, as long as we abstract from the 
pragmatic dimension of people's communication or speech ("parole") in the 
context of situations we cannot deal with the possibility of identifying designated 
objects as real objects in space and time and hence are not entitled, in principle, to 
speak of denotata as objects of the semantical dimension, but only of designata, 
i.e., of objects of sign-reference within the frame of abstract semantical systems 
hence, eventually, of scientific theories. The designata as objects of the abstract 
semantic dimension of language-systems may eventually re·present empty classes 
without a corresponding extension of identifiable denotata, or they may represent 
classes with a corresponding extension of fictive denotata, as e.g. witches or angels; 
or, finally, they may represent classes of theoretical entities, i.e., of denotata that 
may not be directly identified in space and time but whose assumption may only· 
at best - be indirectly legHimized, so to speak, in connection with a corroboration 
of the whole theory by way of its identifiable experiential consequences. This point 
has been recognized in modern logic of science since Carnap's acknowledgment that 
the problem of verification cannot be settled within the frame of semantics but 
only within the frame of pragmatics. 
Furthermore, it is important to take notice of Pierce's semiotical insight that the 
function of identifying real objects in space and time cannot be fulfilled by purely 
conoeptual signs or "symbols", in the Peircean terminology, but only by 
"indexical" expressions, as e.g., "this there", whose semantical reference cannot be 
5 
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conceived of independently of the pragmatic context of situation-bound sign-use. 
So, when in what follows I am talking about the real denotatum as an object of the 
semantical dimension of the sign-function, as it is suggested also by the diagram (see 
figure I), I shall aways presuppose not the abstract semantical dimension of a 
language-systems, but the pragmatically integrated semantical dimension. 
Thus far, my interpretation of the three-dimensional schema is in accordance, I 
think, with the general spirit of Morris' conception, as it was ac�pted by Carnap.4 
But now I wish to introduce the main point of the idea of a transcendental 
semiotics which can no longer be covered by the Morris/Carnap-conception of 
semiotics. 
I start out from the consideration that the sign-function through which our 
cognition of real objects is mediated · or, for that matter, the representative 
function of the language-systems or semantical frameworks through which the 
object reference of theories is made possible - cannot itself be philosophically 
adequate, i.e., thematized as a semantical object of the sign-function but must be 
rather considered as a condition of the possibility of describing and hence 
interpreting something as an object of intersubjectively valid theoretical knowledge. 
This view is not even rejected but, rather, reconfirmed by Carnap's conception of 
the function of "semantical frameworks" in his famous essay "Empircism, 
Semantics, and Ontology". 5 From the view-point of constructive semantics in the 
sense of Carnap and Tarski, one may of course argue that the sign-function or the 
function of language as a semantical framework of interpretative world-description 
may itselC be made the object of semantical reference in a meta-language and so 
forth ad infinitum. I think, however, that this argument reconfirms rather than 
refutes my view. For it suggests that the actual function of language as a mediation 
of interpretation and intersubjectively valid representation of objects cannot, in 
principle, be objectified. Hence it turns out to be a transcendental condition of the 
possibility, rather than a possible object, of sign-mediated knowledge. 
Also this view is reconfirmed rather than rejected, I think, by Carnap and his 
followers; for they themselves suggest that the function of philosophy is to be 
distinguished from that of empirical science by the circumstance that philosophers 
have to construct ideal languages or semantical systems as possible frameworks of 
the language of science. Thus constructive semantics, in a sense, has to practice the 
"Copernican turn", postulated by Kant, through projecting those quasi­
transcendental frames that prescribe the form of possible appearance to the world 
in as far as it can be made the object of intersubjectively valid description. 
However, if my transcendental interpretation of language-systems, i.e., of the 
syntactico-semantical part of semiosis, is justified, then the same interpretation 
with respect to the (integrative) pragmatic dimension of the sign-function must 
hold good; for, without it, the semantical dimension of reference cannot imply 
concrete denotation of real objects of knowledge in space and time, as we already 
have pointed out. Just as we cannot consider the semantical conditions of 
.world-description as possible objects of that very description, but must rather 
ascribe a transcendental function to them, in the same sense we must assign a trans­
cendental function to ourselves in so far as we are constructing and successfully 
interpreting �-systems as semantical frameworks of possible world-description. 
6 
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This seems indeed to be as plausible, in principle, as attributing a transcen­
dental function to ourselves in so far as we are bringing forward validity-claims of 
propositions or arguments to be confirmed or cor..tested by any virtual member of 
an unlimited community of argumentation. For in both cases we are not primarily 
playing a role that is empirically releva.,t in a psychological or sociological sense; 
we are rather taking over a role that obliges us to he in charge, so to speak, of the 
transcendental subject of knowledge or thought. This may be shown most con­
vincingly through an examination of the current counterarguments to the possibil­
ity of a (transcendental-philosophical) abstraction from the empirical properties of 
ourselves as subjects of cognition or argumentation. For these counterarguments 
have at least implicitly to take the form of assertions like "I hereby assert that in 
making and judging statements we cannot abstract from the fact that we are individ­
uals with specific biographies and socio-historical backgrounds, etc." Now this very 
argument· against the possibility of the idea of a transcendental subject of cognition 
or thought shows that, by the first "we", in contradistinction to the second "we", 
it must appeal to ourselves in as far as we are in charge of the transcendental sub­
ject of thought. 
The fact that we can make our validity-claims explicit by performative 
expressions like "I hereby state that ... "gives also a hint as to how it is possible for 
us to know about the actual sign-function as condition of the possibility of thought 
which, as I have already pointed out, cannot be objectified, on principal. In fact, 
our tzamcen<Eltal·semiotic Jmowledge about the actual function of signs or, 
respectively, language as condition of the possibility of intersubjectively valid 
thought and hence Jmowledge may be conceived of as reflective radicalization, so to 
speak, of that reflective knowledge that is first brought to verbal expression 
through the self-referential performative parts of constative speech-acts. On the 
level of transcendental semiotics that reflective knowledge takes the form of 
propositions that are self-referential by their universal truth-claim. Should it be 
objected that self-referential speech must lead to semantical antinomies, in the 
present lecture I can only answer that on my 8<XXlUnt this talk rests on a confusion 
between formalized sematical systems, which are to be immun'icized a priori against 
any possible antinomies and hence must not contain self-referential propositions. 
The language of philosophy must take the risk and the advantage of the pragmatic 
self-referentialness of natural language, in order to talk about formalized semantical 
systems in general. This view is at least strongly supported by the fact that neither 
B. Russell in his semantical theory of types nor A. Tarski in his semantical 
(meta-logical) theory of meta-languages or language-stages could avoid using a 
special (philosophical) meta-langauge that cannot itself be placed into the infinite 
hierarchical order of types or, respectively, meta-languages which it is talking about. 
In fact, I am prepared to deal with the current renunciation (disavowal) of 
pragmatically self-referential speech and hence self-reflection of thought as being 
itself one of the abstractive and reductive fallacies to be uncovered and analyzed in 
the light of a transcendental-semiotic account o( the triadic sign-relation. 6 
From this excursion into the problematic of philosophical self-reflection of 
thought we may come back to the claim that we must assign a transcendental 
interpretation not only to the syntactico-semantical part of t.he sign-function but 
7 
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also to its actual pragmatic dimension, i.e., to the dimension of our actual 
language-use, and in that context to the dimension of our constructing and 
successfully interpreting language-systems as semantical frameworks of 'possible 
world-description. Now this means that all philosophical talk about the problems of 
language-construction and interpretation, even if it is arguing for a purely 
conventionalist character of all semantical frameworks of possible world-descrip­
tion, fulfills the reflective function of a transcendental pragmatics within the frame 
of a transcendental semiotics. For, in so far as semantical frameworks are in fact 
conditions of the possibility of world-interpretation, philosophical talk about our 
construction and interpretation of semantical frameworks fulfill s the function of a 
transcendental reflection on the subjective-intersubjective conditions of the 
possibility of world-interpretation. And, in addition, on the subjectlve-intersubjec­
tive conditions of the possibility of conventions lying at the ground of semantical 
frameworks. In fact, the question as to the subjective-intersubjective conditions of 
the possibility of conventions appears to me as the most radical question of a 
transcendental pragmatics, since it eventually brings to bear transcendental 
reflection even in the back, so to speak, of conventionalism which is usually 
considered as a radical alternative to transcendentalism. 7 
Now, at this point, my transcendental interpretation of the Morris/Carnap­
scheme of three-dimensional semiosis or semiotics, respectively, definitively departs 
from the usual interpretation accepted in analytical logic of language and science. 
For, Morris and Carnap and their many followers in analytical philosophy take it as 
a matter of course that the pragmatic dimension of semiosis, i.e., interpretative use 
of signs or whole language-systems by human subjects, may be objectified as a topic 
of empirical-behavioristic pragmatics in principally the same way as the sign. 
mediated behavior of animals and human beings, i.e., in organisms, as it is 
investigated, say, by psycho· and socio-linguistics. s 
Of co·urse, as I already indicated, according to Morris and Carnap, empirical 
pragmatics, in the same way as empirical-syntactics and semantics, may have a 
formal constructivist pendant that provides it with a conceptual framework. But 
formal pragmatics, as it is conceived in analytical philosophy, has nothing to do 
with a self-reflective thematization of the conditions of the possibility of 
language-constructiort and interpretation but rather has been developed in the 
meantime as a semantization-strategy with respect to primarily subjective and 
self-reflective aspects of the· actual pragmatic dimension (e.g., as in performatives 
and indexical expressions). These aspects of self-reflective speech-acts, which, in my 
opinion, may be considered as 'Conditions of the possibility of human self-reflection 
and hence of human reason, are hopefully made the objects of a semantical 
reference by the meta-language of pure pragmatics. Eventually, in connection with 
a semantics of possible worlds which deals with propositional attitudes not as a 
topic of transcendental-pragmatic self-reflection of human speech and thought, but 
rather as a topic of epistemic and modal logic that accounts for the meaning of the 
different self-reflective attitudes in terms of the possible truth of the coordinated 
propositional contents in those possible worlds where facts were corresponding to 
the propositional contents.9 
At best, J could claim a correspondence between my conception of a 
8 
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transcendental-pragmatic dimension of semiosis and the fact that Carnap conceives 
of the choice of semantical frameworks, and hence of the pragmatical conventions 
concerning their construction and interpretation, as a matter of praxis rather than 
of theory as it is represented for him by the empirical sciences which answer the 
so-called internal questions that are made possible by the semantical frameworks. 
However, through his distinction between constructive praxis and empirical theory, 
Carnap does not renew the transcendental difference in the sense of Kant but rather 
pleads for a non·cognitivist conception of philosophy. 
In the present context I shall not yet argue for the priority of my transcendental 
interpretation of semiosis and semiotics over the usual one. Instead I shall now turn 
to the application of the transcendentally interpreted scheme of semiosis for the 
purpose of providing a distinction between and an ideal-typical reconstruction of 
the three paradigms of First Philosophy. 
III. Possible Types of First Philosophy in the 
Light of Transcendental Semiotics. 
If one takes the triadic sign-function or semiosis, as we have thus far, as the 
necessary mediation of world-interpretation and hence as a condition of the 
possibility of any cognition of reality, then one may jn the first place introduce a 
rather clear cut distinction between three possible types of First Philosophy, 
according to whether the foundation of First Philosophy takes into consideration 
only the first, or the first and the third, or all three places of the triadic 
sigxHelation, in order· to account for the primary topic of philosophy. (The 
presupposed sequence of the places of the sign-relation has been marked by roman 
ciphers in our diagram; see figure I). 
The three possible types of First Philosophy, distinguished according to the 
proposed semiotical order of succession, may be approximately identified with the 
three paradigms of First Philosophy as they actually followed one another in the 
history of philosophy. For it may be said that general metaphysics or ontology in 
the Aristotelian sense considers real being (1), as it may designate and denotate by 
naming signs (proper and general names), as the primary topic of philosophy. 
Furthermore, transcendental philosophy or critique of pure reason in the Kantian 
sense may be said to consider being (I) only in so far as it is a possible cognitive 
object of the transcendental subject or consciousness (III) as a topic of philosophy, 
without considering language or the sign-function as a transcendental condition of 
the possibility of inte-rsubjectively valid world-interpretation and henc.e object­
constitution. Finally, transcendental semiotics, as it has been outlined in the 
preceding, may be considered as a third paradigm of First Philosophy that considers 
being as possible object (denotatum and oosignatum) of sign-mediated world-inter­
pretation and hence considers the (entire) triadic sign-relation as the primary topic 
of philosophy. 
This first introduction of the three paradigms of First Philosophy stands of 
course in need of a great deal of further clarification which I shall try to give in 
what follows. 
First I should perhaps make clear that from our schematic derivation of the 
9 
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paradigms of First Philosophy it does not follow that, e.g., the first paradigm, 
(ontology), would completely exclude ep istemology and/or philosophy of language, 
or that the second paradigm, (transcendental philosophy}, that considers being as 
possible object of knowledge would still completely exclude philosophy of 
language. Such an interpretation of the two first paradigms would not only 
contradict the historical facts but would also miss the point of the idea of 
paradigms of First Philosophy. This idea is illustrated by the fact that under the 
domination of the ontological paradigm questions of epistemology and of 
philosophy o f  language are dealt with only as questions of being. And again, by the 
fact that under the domination of the transcendental epistemological paradigm, 
questions of language-philosophy can be dealt with only as possible questions 
regarding certain special objects of knowledge (cognition). 
Furthermore, it may strik;e you that transcendental semiotics itself figures, on 
the one hand, as a paradigm of First Philosophy and, on the other hand, serves as 
the basic idea from which the possibility of all three paradigms of Fi.rst Philosophy 
is derived. l s  there perhaps some sort of question-begging or at least some dogmatic 
prejudicing present here in the play? 
My answer to this question is that the double function of transcendental 
semiotics in fact expresses the claim that transcendental semioti<:s is not simply a 
third type in a (random) enumeration of possible types of First Philosophy. Rather, 
it takes its place according to a sequential order which it is able to justify such that 
it may figure itself as a possible and necessary synthesis of the two preceding 
paradigms of Firsl Philosophy. Thus my conception of a revolutionary succession 
of different paradigms of thought differs from that of Th.Kuhn1 0 in that it implies 
some sort of a Hegelian idea of possible progress in the history of human thought. 
Properly speaking, it does not imply any claim of a causally explicable and hence 
predictable necessity of progress. Rather, it implies the claim that the three 
paradigms of First Philosophy make up a hierarchical order of levels of critical 
reflection and also make up an order of necessary succession in the teleological 
sense without providing any guarantee of its being realized in advance of the facts 
of history. 
Now, after taking a closer look at our schema of the triadic relation of semiosis, 
one might come to question our suggested derivation of the three paradigms of 
First Philosophy by the argument that there are still four other possible derivations 
apparently arbitrarily neglected in our approach thus far. In fact, why should we 
not be allowed to derive the following four possible types of First Philosophy from 
our schema? One that considers only real being (I) and signs or language (II) as 
primary topic of philosophy; one that assigns this dignity only to signs or language 
(II} and for the subject of sign-interpretation (III}; and, finally, two (different) 
types that restrict the topic of First Philosophy to either signs (II) or to the human 
consciousness and its contents (III). 
Now, I think that it is neither necessary to forbid these derivations nor difficult 
to coordinate conceivable types or paradigms of First Philosophy to them. 
Thus, one may relate the last mentioned possibility to subjective idealism which 
was hypothetically supposed by Descartes before (previous to) his attempt to prove 
the existence of an external world and was adopted later by Berkeley and 
10 
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eventually refuted by Kant in his argument for the transcendental presupposition of 
the structure o f  external objects of experience by the (temporal) structure of inner 
. 1 l experience. 
The alternative possibility of distinguishing signs as the only primary topic of 
philosophy could be called sernioticism and may be associated historically with 
some suggestions of the early Peirce which seem to dissolve the whole world 
(including nature and the human subject of cognition) into processes of semiosis.12 
In a sense, Carnap's constructive semanticism, which does ruot recognize either 
ontological or transcendental-epistemological problems that co,uld not be reduced 
to empirical ones or be translated into the "formal mode" of dealing with 
syntactico-semantical frameworks, could also be associated with this type of First 
Philosophy. 
The possibility, then, of a type of First Philosophy that only take signs and 
subjective sign-interpretation into regard could be called semiotical idealism. It  has 
perhaps only been hypothetically or approximately adopted m the history of 
philosophy, thus, e.g., by the later Berkeley who conceived of the world as a 
context of natural signs t.brough which God is speaking to us.1 3 
Finally, the most interesting of the four newly suggested types is the first one 
which only takes real being and signs or language into regard. For it must, I think, 
be considered as more or less realized by the thusfar developed paradigm of 
(language-) analytical philosophy. For, the early Wittgenstein's immersion of the 
transcendental subject of sign·interpn:lation into the transcendental-logical form of 
language that delimits the world of possible facts for us,1 4 transcendental 
self-reflection of the subjective-intersubjective conditions of sign-mediated world­
-interpretation has not been renewed in language-analytical philosophy. Instead, 
some sort of onto-scmantics15 has been developed. Thus, for example, in the turn 
from Carnap's semanticism Quine's conception of ontological relativity16 or, in a 
very different way that sometimes comes close t o  our conceptio1n of transcendental 
pragmatics or semiotics, in Strawson's conception of the "Bounds of Sense".1 7 
Having derived and tentatively illustrated the total of seven possible types of 
First Philosophy in light of our semiotical scheme, we must face the question 
whether this fertility in our vantage-point must not overthrow or discredit our 
conception of the teleologically intelligible succession of just three paradigms of 
First Philosophy that would make up the backbone, of the internal history of 
philosophy, according to a certain developmental logic. 
Now, the fact that all seven types could be derived from the transcendentally 
interpreted scheme of sem iosis in my opinion should, on the co,ntrary, suggest that 
it might be possible to adapt the derivation of the last four types to that of the first 
three types. For example, by showing that the last four types may be understood as 
sub-types and hence sub-paradigms of the three main paradigms of First 
Philosophy. In order to show this, we should reflect upon how it actually was 
possible for us to derive the seven types or paradigms of First Philosophy from the 
transcendental-semiotical presuppositions invested, so to 3peak, in ov.r triadic or 
three-dimensional scheme of semiosis. What is the internal relationship of the seyen 
derived paradigms to the presupposed transcendental scheme of semiosis? It seems 
clear from the outset that this question cannot be answered by any pythagorcan-
11 
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mathematical play with the possibilities of combination or isolation of the three 
places of the triadic sign-relation, unless some deeper interpretation is connected 
with the schematical heuristics. Nonetheless, let us facilitate the business of 
schematical heuristics by symbolizing the seven possible types of First Philosophy 
with the aid of the seven possible combinations of the three roman ciphers. Thus, 
we get the following seven items: (I), (TT), (III), (I/II), (I/III), (II/II I), (I/II/III). 
As an interpretative answer to the question of the relationship between the seven 
paradigms and the triadic scheme of semiosis, I then would suggest first that besides 
the paradigm of transcendental semiotics 'which reflectively takes into regard all 
three places of the sign-relation as conditions of the possibility of a meaningful 
world, all the other six types are constituted by some abstraction. The abstraction 
by which each of these six types is constituted may easily be read from the 
pertammg symbolizations. Now, abstraction in First Philosophy may be 
methodologically justified so long as it is under control of transcendental reflection 
as abstraction from a dimension of semiosis; otherwise, I would suggest, an 
abstractive fallacy must come about. from th
.
is point of view one may consider all 
six possible types of First Philosophy besides transcendental semiotics as based on 
some type of abstractive fallacy. 
But this formal-systematical consideration does not yet account for the 
privileged status of those three types I have distinguished as main paradigms of First 
Philosophy (viz. (I), (I/III), and (I/II/III)) in contradistinction to the other four 
types which were considered as mere sub-paradigms (viz. (II), ( Ill), (I/11), (II/III). 
Why, for example, should it not be plausible to regard ontology (I), semioticism or 
semanticism (II) and subjective idealism (III) as the fundamental paradigms of First 
Philosophy? Could they not have historically followed and replaced one another in 
this very order of sequence? 
This last question compels us to connect the view-point of historical ex post 
facto understanding with the formal-systematical distinctions. Thereby, I think, it 
becomes clear, that to begin with, the sequence (I), ( I I), (III), even if we equate it  
for the moment with the sequence (I), (I/II/Ill), (I/JII) and hence take the positions 
(II) and (111) as sufficient representations of transcendental semiotics and 
transcendental epistemology, does not make up a plausible order of historical 
succession for the paradigms of First Philosophy. The reason for its implausibility is 
that it suggests the following dialectics of critical self-reflection in the history of 
philosophy: the first step after the aporetic or skeptical discussion of the problems 
of being and nothing, would not have been the question whether or how it is 
possible at all to know the objective truth about being; but, rather, whether or how 
it is possible at all to communicate one's cognition through intersubjectively 
meaningful signs and thereby makr. possible intersubjectively valid knowledge: 
Now, I think, not only the factual succession of the three paradigms of First 
Philosophy, but also the developmental logic of a possible radicalization of critical 
self-reflection in philosophy speaks against this order of succession. For, notwith­
standing the fact that semiotical or language-analytic.al problems had to be dealt 
with from the beginnings of a propositional logic, it nevertheless seems to be only 
after the Kantian question as to the subjective conditions of the possibility of 
objectively valid knowledge that the question as to the semiotical conditions of the 
12 
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possibility of intersubjectively valid (i.e. primarily intersubj ectively meaningful) 
mediation of intersubjectively valid knowledge can be raised in its full critical 
significance. 
This consideration becomes still more persuasive if we compare the anti-meta­
physical suspicion of Kantian critique of knowledge and \tlittgensteinian or 
Carnapian critique of language, respectively. For then it seems rather plausible to 
consider the idea that some or even all questions of metaphysics should be 
meaningless (or non-sensical) due to semantical confusions as a subsequent 
radicalization of the Kantian thesis that metaphysical questions are necessary but 
unsolvable for a finite reason (intellect) than the other way around. I n  other words, 
the idea that our questions may be meaningless for semiotical reasons seems to 
presuppose the consideration that answers cannot be given to certain questions for 
epistemological reasons. 
To resume this point of dlevelopmental order, I think that already the Greek 
sophist, Gorgias, in his famour three theses, which he set up in reaction to the 
eleatic dialectics of being and nothing, not incidentally set the stage for the 
subsequent succession of three paradigms of First Philosophy. For Platonic and 
Aristotelian ontology, Kantian or, for that matter, modern epistemology, and 
twentieth century language-analytical philosophy may be unders.tood as responses 
on the challenge of Georgi.as' three theses: First, there is nothing; second, even if 
there were something it could not be known; and even if it could b e  known, it could 
not be communicated. 
But what about the justification of our claim that the developmental order of 
paradigms o-f First Philosophy is primarily represented by the type-sequence (I),  
(I/III), (I/II/II I), i.e., ontology, transcendental epistemology, transcendental 
semiotics, rather than by ontology (I) being followed by other possible types that 
also have an affinity with epistemology and semiotics respectively, such as e.g., 
subjective idealism (Ill) and semioticism/semanticism (II),  or semiotic idealism 
(II/III) and onto-semantics (I/II)? This question becomes even more intrigi.1ing and 
urgent in view of the circumstance that within the factual course of the history of 
European philosophy , Berkeley's subjective or semiotic idealism in fact preceded 
Kant's transcendental idealism which included empirical realism and, last but not 
least, in view of the circumstance that the present st"age of (language-)analytical 
philosophy is characterized b y  semanticism (Carnap, Tarski) and onto-semantics 
(Quine, or for that matter "semantics of possible worlds") rather, than by the 
general adoption of something like transcendental semiotics, including the 
transcendental pragmatics of language. 
In order to answer this question I should first remind you of my former thesis 
that the very fact that transcendental semiotics provides a basis for the derivation 
of the other six possible types of First Philosophy indicates its systematical priority 
as an all-embracing paradigm of First Philosophy. Thusfar we have elucidated this 
view-point only with respect to the claim of transcendental semiotics to suspend 
and preserve the functions of ontology and transcendental epistemology as 
preceding main paradigms of First Philosophy. It remains, then, to show, from the 
same point of view, that transcendental semiotics should also be capable of proving 
its priority as a fulfledged paradigm of First Philosophy with respect to its 
1 3  
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semiotical rivals, viz. semantlc1sm and onto-semantics. The preceding fulfledged 
paradigm of First Philosophy, transcendental epistemology, in a similar sense 
should be capable of proving its priority with respect to ontology as preceding the 
main paradigm and with respect to its epistemological rivals, viz. subjective idealism 
(or, for that matter, Humeian positivism) and semiotic idealism. 
Now, by tlhese theses, I have set up {designated) the main tasks of a critical 
reconstruction of the informal history of First Philosophy · in the light of 
transcendental semiotics. At present I wish only to sketch roughly the strategy of 
my envisaged answers, because there is still a further objectjon to be dealt with 
against the sufficiency of the whole approach. 
Regarding the priority of transcendental semiotics over its semanticist and 
onto-semantisist rivals with respect to the status and function of the fulfledged 
third paradigm of First Philosophy, I can only say this much at this point : 
Semanticism and Onto-Semanticism along the lines of the early Wittgenstein, B. 
Russell, Tarski, Carnap, Popper and Quine and even the language-pragmatical 
philosophy of the later Wittgenstein (in as far as it sticks to the pluralism of factual 
language-games and does no,t answer the question as to the conditions of his own 
capability of dealing with all of them) are positions of (language·) analytical 
philosophy that may be shown to be only provisory stages of the third paradigm of 
First Philosophy. For, they are based on abstractive fallacies with respect to a 
transcendental reflection of the integrative pragmatical dimension of semiosis. 
Regarding the priority of transcendental epistemology as the fulfledged second 
paradigm of F irst Philosophy in comparison with its rivals, viz. subjective idealism 
and positivism , I must say a bit more at this point . I start out from the thesis that, 
in a sense Kantianism is able to supersede and save the functions of ontology by 
speaking of beings as possible objects of knowledge and especially by showing, 
against subjective idealism and positivism, that there is a crucial difference to be 
accounted for between the objective order of appearances in the sense of empirical 
realism and the. subjective succession of ideas in a private consciousness. Moreover, 
the latter presupposes the former, rather than the other way around, as is supposed 
by subjective idealism since its hypothetical assumption by Descartes. 
As a supplement to Kant's "refutation of idealism", one may also show that D. 
Humes's or even E .  Mach's positivism, must in order to gi've meaning to its 
conception of sense-data or neutral elements of experience, necessarily presupposes 
some version of that very unity of consciousness which it denies in order to 
surmount the metaphysics of subjective idealism. Thereby it  also may be shown to 
be only a deficient . sub-paradigm of the modern philosophy of consciousness which 
has its paradigmatic form in a transcendental idealism that includes an empiirical 
realism of objective beings. 
Yet in regard to this Kantian claim which , in a sense, is equivalent to the claim 
of preserving or saving the indispensable functions of ontology. by transcendental 
epistemology, a reservation must be expressed at this point. By his distinction 
between objects of experience as mere appearances and unknowable things-in­
themselves, Kant has shown, against his intention, I think, that transcendental 
epistemology (by its combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism) 
is not definitdy capable of completely doing justice to and saving the functions of 
14 
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ontology as a paradigm of First Philosophy. For, in order to enter into his system 
of philosophy ,  Kant has to presuppose unknowable things in themselves as causally 
affecting our senses. Thereby he is in fact presupposing a piece of preKantian 
ontology that he can neither satisfy nor supersede by his own conception of 
transcendental idealism conjoined with empirical realism. For the causally effective 
function of things-in-themselves, according to Kant's presuppositions, cannot be 
conceived of as a function of the category of causality with respect to the formal 
constitution of the objects of experience but must rather be presupposed as a 
mctaphysical-0ntological cause of the material constitution of experience in 
general. I think that this central aporia of the Kantian system, again and again 
recognized since the day of Fr.H.Jacobi, 1 8 cannot be overcome, in principle, within 
the frame of transcendental epistemology as paradigm of First Philosophy. But may 
be dissolved within the frame of transcendental semio tics, which has to be shown. 
Within the present context I must, however, take into consideration stiU one 
other possible objection against the whole approach of a transcendental �emiotics 
that stands in close connection to the residual problematics of metaphysical 
ontology, as it has been identified as implied in Kant's doctrine of unknowable 
things-in-themselves. 
This residual problematics may be brought to bear on transcendental 
epi�temology not only with respect to the being of things-in-themselves behind the 
possible objects of experience but also with respect to the being of (the same?) 
things-in-themselves behind the transcendental subject of knowing. In fact, Kant 
himself makes use of such a metaphysical presupposition first in his solution o f  the 
antinomy of freedom of the will versus causal determinism and again in his 
supposition of the autonomous legislation of the will of the "intelligible I" in his 
Foundation of the Metaphysi�s of Morals. But still in an othi-.r and more radical 
sense, one may claim that any type of transcendental epistemology or philosophy 
of consciousness must tacitly presuppose some answer to the question of the being 
of the transcendental subj ect or consciousness and its functions. Now, this very 
question may also be raised with respect to the ontological conditions of the 
possibilities of sign-interpretation and hence may also be considered a serious 
objection against the priority of the (third) paradigm of transcendental semiotics 
over the (first) paradigm o.f ontology. For it seems to be an argument against any 
priority-claim of the transcendental philosophy of the conditions of the constitu­
tion of being over ontology as the philosophy of being itself. 
This objection may be connected with, and further illustrated by, another 
objection that concerns the fact that until now l have not really shown that all 
historical paradigms of First Philosophy ( i.e., all great philosophies that have 
represented that claim) may in fact be derived as possible paradigms or 
sub-paradigms from the tr:i.nscendentally interpreted scheme of semiosis. This was 
not shown with respect to the modem philosop hies of being represented by Hegel, 
Marx and Heidegger. These modern philosophies of being, notwithstanding their 
differences, may be characterized precisely by the fact that they ask and try to 
answer the question of what being is with respect to the subject or the united 
subjects of knowing and of communication. Must not their approach necessarily 
transcend that of a transcendental semiotics as well as that of a transcendental 
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epistemology? 
At the conclusion of this lecture, I can only point, by some programma.tical 
remarks, to the envisaged strategy of answering these last two interconnected 
questions as to the ontological status of semiosis and to the possibility of doing 
justice also to the modern philosophies of being from the vantage-point of 
transcenden tal semiotics. 
First, I would like to point out that the modernity of the philosophies of Hegel, 
Marx and H eidegger as philosophies of being lies in the fact that they are dealing 
with the history and the historicity of being including the being or substance of the 
human mind or consciousness. Now, with respect to this problematics, I first of all 
wish to state my systematical claim that it can be· shown to be impossible a priori to 
deal philosophically with history without doing justice to the transcendental status 
of the theoretical truth-claims and no.rmative practical validity-claims of the human 
subjects of history and of cognition of history. For, history cannot be adequately 
conceived of as simply a natural process of change to b e  completely objectified and 
eventually nomologically explained as a reality (that is) independent of its being 
continued and continuously altered by human theory and subjective praxis. Rather, 
it must be defined from the outset as an (irreversible) process of continuous 
dialectical mediation of theory and praxis. That is, as a process that comprjzes, in 
principle, the human attempts of recognizing and rightly continuing this very 
process. Hence it can only be adequately dealt with by those philosophies that are 
able to cope with their own validity-claim as a possible (if not necessary) result of 
history. Therefore, it may be further postulated that an adequate philosophy of the 
history of being cannot contradict the type of transcendental philosophy that does 
not prevent us from considering the human subjects of knowledge and action 
(notwithstanding their transcendental status as carries of truth-claims and norma­
tive validity-claims) as the real beings belonging to real history . Now, it is precisely 
this possibility that is opened up by transcendental semiotics, in so far as it poses 
the transcendental language-gam e, which prevades all factual language-games due tu 
the communicative and virtual argumentative competence of man, in the place of 
an extra-mundane pure transcendental consciousness and thereby surmounts 
"transcendental idealism" in the Kantian sense. 
This general thesis may be provisionally elucidated by some remarks about the 
merits and limitation of Hegel's, Marx's, and Heidegger's philosophies from the 
perspective of our approach . 
Hegel, in a sense, can be considered as the v�ry father or inaugurator of that 
philosophy of history .that, as I claimed, must account for its own transcendental 
status as the possible (or even necessary) result of history. Thusfar his conception 
of the history of being or substance as possible subject of its own cognition does 
not at all overthrow transcendental philosophy as such. Rather, for the first time it 
claims to show the possibility, and moreover even the actuality, of a complete 
mutal mediation of transcendental idealism and quasi-Aristotelian ontology of 
sub stance. With respect to transcendental reflection upon the condition s of the 
possibility of cognition (knowledge) ,  Hegel goes even beyond Kant by taking into 
regard the knowledge-claim of critical-reflective philosophy itself up to the point of 
knowledge of knowledge. Although he simultaneously criticizes so called "philos-
16 
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ophy of reflection" including Kantianism, he does so by understanding his own 
reflective science of the appearenccs of consciousness (in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit) as self-movement of the idea in its development from being in itself through 
"being for itself" to "being in itself and for itself". I think that a true core of this 
approach. of a dialectical mediation between transcendental idealism and ontology 
of history may be preserved by transcendental semiotics. 
The weakness, though, of Hegel's approach, which made it appear to the Young 
Hegelians as the conclusion of theoretical metaphysics that had to be surpassed by 
something beyond philosophy, lay in Hegel's claim, or suggestion of a total 
mediation of ontology and transcendental idealism of consciousness, and hence of 
the material of objective experience and the form of conceptual understanding. 
And a total mediation of reflective theory and subjective praxis, from the 
vantage-point of an a priori conceptual understanding· that has already attained the 
point of ultimate and hence absolute knowledge. By this suggestion of an absolute 
theoretical standpoint at the end of history , Hegel speculatively played over the 
Kantian djstinction between theoretical and practical reason . That is to say, the 
problematic to be faced by the freedom of decision and of existential engagement 
with respect to the unknown future. It was this a priori of an absolute theoretical 
metaphysics of history that urged the Young llegelians, and among them 
Kierkegaard and the young Marx, to project philosophies of existential or social 
praxis that sometimes were considered as transgressing the very idea of 
philosophy. 1 9 At the same time, it became clear that H�el's speculativ� 
anticipation of the theoretical truth of the whole of historical being could not do 
justice . to the difference of transcendental philosophical reflection and empirical 
cognition by sensual experience as it was supposed by Kant and was to become the 
breaking off point from Hegclianism by the empirical sciences in the name of 
positivism. 
Regarding these shortcomings of Hegel's system of total mediation with respect 
to sensuous experience and the need for practical engagement toward the future, I 
consider it possible to show that transcendental semiotics may provide a sort of 
preserving correction of Hegel's approach in three respects. First, with the aid of 
Peirce's analysis of different epistemological (cognitive) sign-fu nctions it can be 
shown that the truth about indexical expressions testifying to sensuous certainty 
mediates between Hegel's position in his famous opening chapter of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Fcuerbach's critique of it (and thus between idealism 
and materialism or, respectively, positivism). Second, with the aid of some ideas of 
C.S. Peirce and J. Royce about the indefinite community of interpretation, to be 
postulated, in a sense, as the transcendental subject of valid cognition of the level of 
transce ndental semiotics, it can be shown that Hegel's speculative Aufhebung o f  the 
truth of the whole history of being into the reflective monologue of one finite 
philosopher may in fact be corrected in favor of the dialog of a1120 rational 
beings,21 that is to be mediated through the progress of empirical science. But this 
correction of Hegel can even preserve and reconfirm Hegel's idea of a necessary 
anticipation of the absolute truth by transforming it into a transcendental-semi­
otical postulate of the possibility, in principle, of coming to consensus about 
meaning and truth within the frame of the infinite dialogue of the indefinite 
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community of interpretation. Finally, it can be shown that the introduction by 
transcendental sem iotics of an ideal community instead of a self-sufficient I as 
transdencental subject brings about a radical new perspective with respect to the 
problems of practical reason, or of the mediation between theory and praxis. But 
this last point may be provisionaly illustrated by some remarks about the 
post-Hegelian philosophies of the mediation, or separation, between scie·ntific 
theory and subjective-intersubjective praxis. 
The dissolution of the Hegelian system of absolute (speculative-theoretical) 
mediation of theory and praxis in the nineteenth century finally led to a kind of 
complementarity system of positivism or scientism without practical reason and 
irrational existentialism of private praxis which was to become the basic ideology of 
the bourgeoisie in the western world of the twentieth century. On the other side, 
Marx's ingenious conception of a critical philosophy of praxis (or of dialectical 
mediation between critical theory and subjective praxis) partly under his own hands 
and definitely under the hands of Engels and Lenin, turned into a dogmatical 
ontology of historical being that is supposed to be capable of totally mediating 
between scientific theory and the subjective praxis of mankind even with regard to 
the unknown future. Seen as a theoretical philosophy from the point of view of our 
account of the intelligible succession of three paradigms of First Philosophy , 
Marxism by its objectivist-scientistic transformation into ontological "Diamat" 
underwent a regression into a pre-Kantian type of First Philosop hy, that is to be 
considered as anachronistic on our account. 
The same is true with respect to those sociologist-naturalist and, for the matter, 
"Structuralist" accounts of history that understand themselves as overtaking or 
making obsolete First Philosophy from an empirical-theoretical perspective outside 
of philosophy. This has to be shown in more detail through a systematical 
derivation of naturalistic fallacies as abstractive and reductive fallacies in the light 
of our scheme of semiosis as precondidon of object-constitution. 
As a philosophy of historical being even with respect to future being, Marxism 
has to be valuated also as practical philosophy that is to be confr0nted to the 
practical aspect of the Western complementarity system. In this respect, it may be 
shown that, by claiming to, solve ethical problems of human praxis by a theory of 
the necessary course of history into future, Marxism became a dogmatic 
counterpart o f  t h e  Western ideological complementarity system of 
positivism/scientism and existentialism by settling down as the Eastern 
integration-system of "Diaznat ". 
Now, it may be shown that this ideological East-West-constellation in the 
twentieth century amounts. to a philosophical dilemma with respect to the problem 
of ethics in the age of science ;2 2 for the alternative of the Western compleme·n­
tarity system and the eastern integration-system turns out to be an alternative 
between personal freedom and free science without intersubjectively binding ethical 
norms, values, or aims, on the one hand, and the dogmatic, fixed and 
institutionalized mediation of theory and praxis without a change of mediation 
through the free decisions of conscience of single human persons as citizens on the 
other hand. In view of this dilemma, I think it possible to show that on the basis of 
transcendental semiotics, or, for that matter, of transcendental pregmatics, an 
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ultimate foundation of intersubjectively binding ethical norms may be provided 
through surmounting the methodical solipsism of traditional philosophy of 
consciousness in favor of the transcendental a priori of the communication­
community: Furthermore, it can be shown, I think, that a dialectical philosophy of 
the undogmatic reconstruction of social history and an ethical strategy for the 
radiation of theory and praxis with respect to the future may be outlined by 
starting from the teleological postulate that the ideal communication-community 
has to be realised within the real one under the hislorical conditions of the ·survival 
of mankind as a real community. And within the frame of this program a 
critical-emancipatory theory of social reality of neo-marxist inspiration may find its 
place. 
From this programmatical point of view, I may finally say some words about the 
relationship between transcendental semiotics (which includes transcendental 
pragmatics and transcendental berm eneutics2 3), and the last great attempt of a 
foundation of First Philosophy as a philosophy of the history of being, as ill: has 
been displayed by Martin Heidegger. Having myself started out in philosophy from 
interpreting Heidegger's transformation of the Husserlian p henomenology as a 
hermeneutics of speech and of language, respectively24 I would like to point oul 
that I still see the great achievement of this philosophy in its account of the 
historical events, not to be disposed of scientifically, but rather achieved by the 
pre-scientific workings of mythos, poetry, and the arts, of the disclosure of meaning 
as the precondition of possible truth and falsehood of propositions.2 5  I even think 
that these Heideggerian perspectives may be liaible to be further displayed in the 
future, along with Cassirer 's philosophy of "symbolic forms" and together with a 
reconstruction of topics along .the lines of G. Vico and the modern conceptions o f  a 
historical-philosophical topics, 2 6 within the hermeneu tical part of semi•:> tics. 
However, I also have come to the conviction that the normative problems o f  the 
conditions of the possibility of intersubjective validity within the realm o f  
theoretical and practical reason cannot be them atized, let alone solved, along the 
lines o f  a Heideggerian philosophy of the "fate of being" (Seinsgeschick) which 
claims to supersede the Western philosophy o f  subjectity (Subjektitat) including the 
autonomy-claim of human reason through an "attentive" (andochtiges) thinking 
lhat justifies its validity-claims by its belonging to (Zugehorigkeit or even Horigkeit) 
- the fate of being. I am afraid that this type of thought, along with certain stripes 
of Marxism, of structuralism , and o f  functionalistic system-theory, may succeed in 
rendering obsolete (together with the bourgeois illusion of a theoretical and 
praclical autonomy of lhe solipsistic subject) the very idea of a human subject of 
theoretical and practical validity-claims and of solidary responsibility. In view of 
this situation, I have come to think that, instead of trying to overcome 
(verwinden) the philosophy of the "transcendental subject" together with 
pre-Kantian metaphysics, (or, for that matter, trying lo dissolve human subjectivity 
into anonymous structures) we should rather try to think of the transcendental 
subject of human cognition and of human praxis as something superindividual, but 
interpersonal. That is, as an instance of intrinsic solidarity that we :must 
countcrfactually presuppose but still have to realize as ideal communication­
community. 
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Thus I would indeed claim that transcendental semiotics as transcendental 
pragmatics and transcendental hermeneutics may also cope with the challenge of 
Heidegger's philosophy of being (and of structuralism, for that matter) from the 
vantage-point of a transformed idea of transcendental subjectivity. 
Notes: 
* The present lecture i:s essentially identical with the first of my Ernst 
Cassirer-lectures about "'Transcendental Semiotics as First Philosophy", deliver­
ed at Yale University in March 19 77. This circumstance may explain and 
eventually provide an apology for the rather schematic and programmatic 
character of my arguments. They have in fact the function of an introductory 
exposition of those topics that are to be dealt with in more detail in the 
following lectures. The Ernst Cassirer-lectures as a whole are to be elaborated for 
publication with Yale University Press. 
* * Editor's Note: Due acknowledgement is made for the editorial assistance of 
Professor George Stack, Department of Philosop hy, SUNY att Brockport. 
1 C.S. Peirce, Collected Jl>apers, ed. by Ch. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, Harvard 
University Press, 193 1-35, 2nd. ed. 1960, vol. II, § 228. 
2 C.W. Morris, Foundation of the Theory of S igns, Intemat. Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science, vol. 1 ,  No. 2,  Chicago : Univ. of Chicago Press, 1938. 
3 Cf. C.W. Morris, Signs, Language , and B�avior, New York: G. Braziller, 1946. 
4 Strictly speaking, this assessment of concordance is already doubtful. For it 
seems clear to me that the fact that the real obj ect of cognition can only be con­
sidered to be the object of the pragmatically integrated semantic dimension of the 
sign-relation implies already that the idea of a satisfactory explication to "truth'' 
to be provided by pure semantics must amount to an abstractive fallacy. This 
does not mean to equate the problem of truth-explication with that of verification 
but, rather, to postulate a truth-explication on the basis of (a transcendental sem­
iotics of) the tria�ic sign-relation. 
5 R. Carnap , "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology ", in : ReVU1e Intern. de Philos., 
4 (1950), 20-10; repr. in R. Carnap , Meaning and Necessity, Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 2nd ed .  1956. 
6 Cf. my essay ''Types of Rationality to-day : the Cont:·nuum of Reason between 
Science and Ethics", Proceedings of the International Symposium Rationality 
To-day, Ottawa Oct. 1 9 7 7 ,  ed. by T. F. Geracts, Ottawa University Press. 
7 Cf my essay "Sprechakttheorie i°.tnd transzendentale Sprachpragmatik zur Frage 
ethischer Normen", in K.-0. Apel (ed.), Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie, 
Frankfurt a.M. : Suhrkamp, 1976, 10-173. 
11 For a critical examination of this approach see my Introduction into C.W. 
Morris, Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten, Dusseldorf: Schwann, 9-66. 
9 Even if the program of dealing with the epistemologically relevant problems of 
pragmatics within the frame of a semantics of possible worlds should be 
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successful - as an extension, so to speak, o f  that projection of actual thought 
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